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MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

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## **Executive Summary**

**Title:** Why it is important for the Marine Corps to begin operations in failing states.

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**Thesis:** There are so many documents on engaging failing states produced by the White House, the Defense Department, the State Department and various other agencies that it becomes very confusing to thread them all together. As the Marine Corps prepares to address these future challenges little is focused towards the junior leaders.

**Discussion:** The purpose of this paper is to bring together the myriad of documents and try to do the following:

1. Explain what a failing state is and explain how failing states are a danger to the United States.
2. Give an overview of the United States government's plans to engage these failing states.
3. Discuss the Marine Corps's plan on how to support these governmental plans, specifically the Security Cooperation Marine Air Ground Task Force (SCMAGTF).
4. Discuss key considerations that junior Marine leaders should be prepared for when conducting operations in failing states.

**Conclusion:** The United States faces a new era of security challenges. Many of these challenges will come from threats emanating within weak and failing states. Transnational terrorism and criminal organizations will hide and operate in ungoverned spaces and in countries that are not strong enough to defend themselves against these illicit actors. Disease, conflict, famine and natural disasters can cause weak states to fail; these breakdowns can lead to destabilization of entire regions. The United States is the only country capable of projecting the power needed to train and assist these weak states to combat these destabilizing threats. It is incumbent on the United States to begin engaging these countries and assisting them to fight these threats. The Marine Corps can and will be an important element of this fight and the junior leaders of the Marine Corps must be educated on these issues.

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## *Preface*

In 2006, I was fortunate enough to hear some senior Marines discussing the troubles that were coming from countries in the 'Arc of Instability'. This Arc encompasses the portions of the world in which the countries are considered unstable due to numerous reasons. The borders of the Arc of Instability are fluid, but they begin roughly in Central America, the Caribbean Basin, parts of South America, extend to Africa up through the Middle East, Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan and the former Soviet Socialist Republics of Central Asia right up to the Chinese border, then through South East Asia, through Indonesia and Oceania. North Korea and the Philippines are also part of the Arc. (See Appendix 5 for Arc of Instability map).

They discussed how the Marine Corps could be changed to operate in this new world of transnational terrorism and international criminal organizations and in assisting failing states and that the Marine Corps needed, as an institution to undertake these challenges. This conversation really sparked my interest because I had been the Operations Officer for 3<sup>rd</sup> Battalion, 8<sup>th</sup> Marine Regiment, during Operation SECURE TOMORROW in Haiti (one of the "failing states" that were mentioned). I truly was fortunate to participate with my Battalion Commander, Colonel (now BGen) D.H. Berger, as he formulated plans to improve the situation in Haiti. My thought process was that if we kill or arrest criminals, we'll solve the problems. Col. Berger's thought process rather focused on how to solve the Haitian people problems. Listening to Col. Berger and my Regimental Commander, Colonel (now BGen) C.M. Gurganus, frame a campaign design, then plan and execute operations to support their designs, was truly an education.

One of the most difficult issues we had was explaining what we were really doing to the young Marines. This paper is written for the young NCOs and junior officers of the Marine Corps. My

intent was to take the myriad of documents and directives that have been produced to give guidance to the Marine Corps in the Global War on Terror and boil it down so it can be understood by all Marines. It is important that the young leaders of the Marine Corps understand the goals and directions of the United States government because the burden of carrying orders out rests upon their shoulders. A failing state is a country that has failed or is failing in one or all of four main areas; physical security, valid political institutions, economic management, and social welfare infrastructure. These failures can come from a multitude of reasons; conflict, ineffective government, governmental collapse, natural disaster or economic collapse. Assisting failing states is in the strategic goals of the United States and the Marine Corps will be intimately involved in these missions.

## Engagement of Failing States:

Why should the United States conduct operations in areas that have no real economic or other apparent value to the United States? This is a question that is asked everyday and truthfully there is no easy answer. There are references to terrorists using these areas, humanitarian concerns and a myriad of other issues. But why commit forces and money to these areas? *"We – even we here- hold the power, and bear the responsibility."* President Lincoln stated over 150 years ago, those who hold the power, bear the responsibility. The United States is now the only country that is capable of projecting all elements of national power anywhere in the world. The United States has the power, but is it the United States' responsibility to run the world? No. Is it to keep our citizens and allies safe? Yes, and threats that are coming from failing states are a clear danger. The United States must invest its forces and assets early into failing states or it will pay the price later. It is much more economical to assist a state before it fails than to reconstruct it after it has collapsed. The Marine Corps is a force that has a long and distinguished history of assisting countries in need and can become a pillar in the United States policy towards assisting failing states.

The term 'failing state' cannot be agreed upon by agencies in the United States Government and it has dozens of definitions. For this paper, a failing state is a country that has failed or is failing in one or all of four main areas: physical security, valid political institutions, economic management, and social welfare infrastructure. These failures can come from a multitude of reasons; conflict, ineffective government, governmental collapse, natural disaster or economic collapse. This paper will review some of the problems emanating from failing countries, then



discuss the strategy that has been put forward by the United States on engaging failing states and then discuss how to employ the Marine Corps into these failing states.

### **Problems emanating from failing countries**

*"In this world there is always danger for those who are afraid of it."* George Bernard Shaw

Shaw wrote, there is always danger out in the world and the United States has realized that the world is a much more dangerous place if it does not venture out and assist these failing states. When a state fails, it creates a vacuum. The people still need these requirements for life; food, water, protection, etc. If there is nothing to provide it for them, they will take it from others. This struggle for life creates conflict, and conflicts spread. As the Roman Empire crumbled, its vacuum created hundreds, if not thousands of conflicts. As the British and French colonial empires fell, the result was more conflicts (of course, some of these conflicts were former colonies fighting for independence against the British and French). In recent history, state failures in Somalia and Sudan have caused untold numbers of deaths through starvation, genocide, and armed combat. According to The Failing States Index 2007 in *Foreign Policy Magazine* July/August 2007, there are over 70 states are considered weak or failing. (See map in Appendix 1).

Failing states are dangerous to the United States for many reasons, but four stand out: harboring of terrorism, harboring of criminal organizations, regional instability and disease control.

"The United States and countries cooperating with us must not allow the terrorists to develop new home bases. Together, we will seek to deny them sanctuary at every turn."<sup>1</sup> This quote from the *National Security Strategy of 2002* was in direct response to the actions of September

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<sup>1</sup> National Security Strategy 2002. Pg 4.

11<sup>th</sup>, 2001. For too long the United States did not pay adequate attention to areas of the world that were not crucial to the interests of the United States. Humanitarians in the United States and other countries voiced their concerns to appeal to other citizens' moral conscience, but could not raise much support if the country was not of economic/ strategic importance. This practice of ignoring areas of the world can be discussed at length, but it is a practice that the United States cannot afford to employ anymore. Pearl Harbor shocked a pre-World War II United States into the realization that it could no longer sit in a defensive position behind the Pacific and Atlantic and keep the enemy away. After September 11, the United States has relearned the lesson. Fortress America needs an aggressive "patrolling" plan outside its borders. The United States must push out into these areas to deny terrorists safe havens and areas in which to recruit, train and operate freely in. Just as with all organizations, when terrorist organizations are free to operate, without fear of reprisals, they can plan hideous plots, such as September 11<sup>th</sup>. In the worst case scenario, terrorist organizations can set up facilities for producing chemical and biological weapons. Failing states cannot stop terrorists from using their territory to further their training planning and operations.

War and conflict have caused many states to fail, but economic failure can devastate a country just as badly. Criminal organizations are stealing revenue from every country in the world. Through smuggling, counterfeiting, fraud, etc. the world economy is losing money to these criminals. A criminal doesn't care if a country fails, he will steal every dollar, mark, pound, ruble he can. Columbia was a very good example of criminals almost taking complete control of a country. The billions of dollars that the United States has invested in fighting drugs and drug cartels in Colombia is staggering from 2001 to 2006 the United States gave Colombia

\$2,667,000,000.<sup>2</sup> Transnational crime organizations are used by terrorist organizations to generate income and smuggle weapons. The concern is now over these organizations being used to smuggle in chemical/ biological agents and many other items that terrorists can use to attack the United States and its allies. Failing states cannot stop criminals from using their territory for theft, drug smuggling, slavery and illegal arms proliferation.

The United States is affected by failing states due to their capacity to weaken large entire regions. “[F]ailed states represent a threat to U.S. national security is that they often spawn wider regional conflicts, which can substantially weaken security and retard development in their sub-regions”<sup>3</sup>

These failing states act like a fire in your neighbors’ house, if you do nothing your house and your entire neighborhood may burn. Failing states will cause further regional instability and will pull other weak states into chaos.

Right now poverty, disease, and humanitarian emergencies are overwhelming weak governments around the world, Haiti and several Central African countries are near or are past the breaking point. Poverty causes starvation and forces migration; people leave their homes and try to find food, work, anything in order to stay alive. Populations shift to areas that may be agriculturally self sustaining, but food output cannot support the increase in population and this causes famine. Displaced people move to urban areas in search of work, the urban center cannot provide jobs to everyone and cannot provide services to this new population. Strong states have trouble dealing

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<sup>2</sup> USAID, Summary of Foreign Aid

<sup>3</sup> Susan E. Rice, Focus on Failed States , Policy Brief #116, The Brookings Institution, February 2003

with large population shifts; population shifts can collapse a weak state. Competition for food, water, and shelter now leads to violence and make the situation worse. Disease knows no borders, as we have seen from the AIDS virus and Avian influenza (bird flu) has spread rapidly from areas that are underdeveloped. People afflicted by disease who have no access to medical help will go in search of it. Through no malice, but simply because they want to survive people will spread the disease farther and farther. Hurricanes cause unbelievable damage and are difficult to rebuild in a developed country, but in a weak or failing state a natural disaster can be truly catastrophic. The earthquakes, monsoons, tsunamis, droughts and other natural disasters spell doom for failing states. Failing states cannot provide basic human needs for its people, which will result in disease, famine, drought and forced migration.

It may not be the most glamorous work for the United States military, but assisting failing states appeals to our traditional American values of charity, hope and generosity. It strengthens our moral leadership as the world's only superpower. The United States has a responsibility to assist these failing states. If we do not help out, then religious Islamic extremists and criminals organizations will be able to operate without fear of reprisals and will recruit more and more people for their group.

### **The United States Government's Strategy on Engaging Failing States**

The National Security Strategy (NSS) of the United States of America outlines the broad vision about how the United States must assist failing states in order to improve the security of America. It is a lofty goal, but one that is absolutely necessary in the Global War on Terrorism. The NSS has been attacked by many critics; Chester Crocker of Georgetown University School

of Foreign Service stated in *Foreign Affairs*, September/October 2003: "The Bush administration has spoken about the dangers posed by failed and failing states, but it has not made fixing these trouble spots a top priority, concentrating instead on rogues and weapons of mass destruction. This error will undermine the administration's broader objective of making the world a safer place. Washington must develop a coherent and committed strategy to prevent and contain state failure. Unless it does, the United States will soon face a new set of global challenges and be overwhelmed."<sup>4</sup>

Dr. Crocker's statement is a healthy challenge and one that must be answered. The NSS is a fine starting point, but the United States must take steps from the concept phase to the practical. The Marine Corps is an organization that can be a key component in the coherent and committed strategy to address the dangers of failing states.

*"When a President sends American troops to war, a hidden timer starts to run. He has a finite period of time to win the war before the people grow weary of it."* Richard Nixon<sup>5</sup>

This quote by President Nixon speaks volumes about the mindset of the citizens of the United States. One of the key issues in starting this failing state engagement strategy begins with the citizens of the United States. The American people must be educated on why we are sending American military personnel/ government employees possibly into harm's way and why we are investing American tax payers' money into these failing countries. This will be very difficult task, especially when there are so many Americans who have little patience for domestic welfare systems. The American public and its leaders must be educated that this is not a short term

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<sup>4</sup> Chester A. Crocker, Engaging Failing States, *Foreign Affairs*, Sept/Oct 2003.

<sup>5</sup> Richard Nixon, *No More Vietnams*, (New York, Arbor House) 1985

endeavor, but one that is crucial to American security. Assisting failing states is not a something that can be defined by a decisive victory or by a finite period of time. It is a painstakingly long process in which the United States may be involved for decades. The Cold War lasted over 70 years and this new Long War will last just as long if not longer. Instead of halting the spread of communism, the United States is now halting the spread of terrorism, extremism and illicit activities. There is no simple formula or process to apply and miraculously a failing state is now quickly restored. There will be a perception within the United States that engaging failing states will be a hole that we are throwing money and people into with no visible success. It is a gamble, but one that the government of the United States has committed to and one that is vital to the United States' security. This preventative strategy is like firefighters who inspect neighborhoods for hazards, in doing this they prevent fires, but the taxpayers pay him to fight fires. So if there are no fires, are the firefighters really needed? The answer is yes; prevention works in fires and failing states. It is much better to prevent a crisis, but everyone must be prepared for the crisis. This is not an easy concept for the United States because success is defined by a quick victory. The "hidden timer" that President Nixon talked about cannot be used to measure success.

There are many documents that guide the United States in setting policy on how to engage these failing states. The National Security Strategy, the National Defense Strategy, the National Security Presidential Directive - 44, the Department of State and USAID Strategic Plan FY 2007-2012 and many other documents. All of these documents lay out concepts on how the United States will engage failing states and give vague guidance on how the United States military will be used in these strategic visions. But the US military cannot do this alone; it will

need the full support of all the other instruments of national power (diplomatic, informational and economic).

In the Diplomatic Area, National Security Presidential Directive-44 (NSPD-44), the Secretary of State “shall coordinate and lead integrated United States Government efforts, involving all U.S. Department and Agencies with relevant capabilities, to prepare, plan for, and conduct stabilizations and reconstruction activities.”<sup>6</sup> This means the State Department is the lead agency in engaging and assisting failing states. The cold hard facts are the US State Department still runs at the Cold War speed and it severely undermanned. It is not funded, staffed or organized to quickly comprehend a country's weakness or failure, respond, and then plan a comprehensive and lasting plan to deal with the failing state. The State Department has taken huge leaps forward, especially with the establishing of the new Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization and U.S. Agency for International Development’s “Fragile States Strategy”. But the fact is right now, the US military will have to provide a certain level of diplomatic actions.

The Informational element of National Power is still a work in progress and there is not one agency in charge of this instrument of national power, nor is there a clear plan for using information operations. There is much discussion of strategic communications<sup>7</sup> and recently the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mike Mullen released a letter on it, instructing U.S. military commanders on how important it is to be able to “understand and engage key

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<sup>6</sup> National Security Presidential Directive - 44

<sup>7</sup> Strategic communications is the application of information operations.

audiences through coordinated information, themes, plans, programs and actions.”<sup>8</sup> This foresight by the Chairman is important, but again proving that the US military will have to provide informational actions.

The Economic element of National Power faces many of the issues that the State department faces as the Treasury and Commerce Department try to catch up and develop economic policies for failing states.

So until the other parts of government can become fully engaged, the question still is how does the US military assist this failing states? The answer is in Department of Defense Directive 3000.05; “Many stability operations are best performed by indigenous, foreign or civilian professionals. Nonetheless, U.S. Military forces shall be prepared to perform all tasks necessary to establish or maintain order when civilians cannot do so.”<sup>9</sup> So now the question faced by the U.S. military now is shall we wait until the rest of the U.S. governmental agencies are ready or do something now? Engaging failing states is a large problem, one that will not shrink or go away with time. It is one that will grow and fester until something is done.

The United States military has decided to act, and the Department of Defense has published its preliminary guidance on how the U.S. military should begin to support operations in failing states. The document ‘Military Support to Stabilization, Security, Transition and Reconstruction Operations, Joint Operating Concept (Military Support to SSTR Operations, JOC)’ mainly focuses on post conflict Iraq and Afghanistan, but there is a central idea that can be used as a

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<sup>8</sup> Strategic Communication Memorandum, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 14 Dec. 2007.

<sup>9</sup> Department of Defense Directive 3000.05



guide for engaging other failing states. The following topics are in the Central idea: 1) Creating a safe, secure environment; 2) Delivering humanitarian assistance/disaster relief; 3) Reconstituting critical infrastructure and essential services; 4) Supporting economic development; 5) Establishing representative, effective government and the rule of law; and 6) Conduct Strategic communications. These concepts are very important and can assist in measuring how successful the programs are working in failing states, but do not outline a specific plan on how to engage failing states.

The United States military doesn't eagerly participate in certain operations; nation building, humanitarian relief, and peace keeping are messy operations and many times there is no clear endstate. An endstate gives purpose to an operation, it focuses the unit. The DOD dictionary defines endstate as; *the clearly defined, decisive, and attainable goal toward which every operation is directed*. Now whether the US military likes its new mission or not, the US military is being called on to assist weak and failing states around the world. This new mission has a very hazy endstate, but it does lead back to a more secure United States.

The United States is absolutely committed to promoting democracy, human rights and freedom. A very difficult part in planning to assist these failing states is we must not use a western lens on how they should organize or how they should run their countries. The goal must be leaders that are committed to their people and begin to provide their basic needs and rights as human beings, they are committed to regional stability and they are committed to being a good member of the international community. Can the United States back a dictator who is working for the good of his country, but has to suppress dissidents? Can the United States support a communist run or

Islamic run (Sharia law) government because they are popularly elected and are running the country effectively? Can we support a country that may have a substantial part of their economy based on illegal activities? We must be able to answer these questions before we go forward in these operations to support failing states.

The Marine Corps could spend a lot of time trying to come up with a concept on where to engage failing states, but the bottom line is the Marine Corps will follow the guidance of the United States Government and the Combatant Commander's campaign plans on how they wish to engage failing states.

#### **How to employ the Marine Corps in these Failing States.**

*Although we will continue to develop our full spectrum capabilities, this war will place demands on our Marines that differ significantly from those of the recent past. Paramount among these demands will be the requirement for Marines to train and mentor the security forces of partner nations in a manner that empowers their governments to secure their own countries.* General James T. Conway, Commandant of the Marine Corps, The Long War Concept, January 2008.

General Conway's statement about empowering other governments to secure their own country is a telling declaration on how the United States recognizes that the dangers coming from failing states are real and must be addressed. As discussed earlier, the problems with failing states will not improve with time, so as Mark Twain said; *The secret of getting ahead is getting started. The secret of getting started is breaking your complex overwhelming tasks into small manageable tasks, and then starting on the first one.*

The Marine Corps has taken a look into this overwhelming task of engaging failing states and broken it down into smaller more manageable pieces. The Marine Corps has decided that they

will work the issue of security. In the Marine Corps' Long War Concept<sup>10</sup>, the Security Cooperation Marine Air Ground Task Force (SCMAGTF) has been established to train and mentor the security forces of partner nations in a manner that empowers their governments to secure their own countries. Just as the Marine Corps has always preached, the Marine Corps wins battles and the Army wins the wars. The Marine Corps can be the initial force into a failing state, and its primary focus will be security and assisting in training local security forces. But the Marine Corps is not capable of handling everything and it will need many reinforcements to deal with the requirements of failed state engagement. Just as in the past, the Marine Corps continuously had Marine Expeditionary Units (MEUs) deployed. Now the Marine Corps will continuously have these SCMAGTF deployed forward to demonstrate to our potential friends that the United States is there to help.

The SCMAGTF will be built around an infantry battalion, with integrated air and logistics support (See Appendix 4 for SCMAGTF organization). In appearance it will look very similar to a MEU, but the focus will be on building partner nation security capacity and supporting partner nation security efforts. The majority of security cooperation training and operations will be provided by the infantry battalion Marines. The logistics unit will focus on supporting the SCMAGTF personnel, but will be reinforced with civil-military operations personnel, a robust engineering capability<sup>11</sup>, enhanced Medical and Dental capabilities (to provide MEDCAP/DENCAP services for indigenous personnel) operational law, veterinary services<sup>12</sup>,

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<sup>10</sup> The Long War Concept, Send in the Marines. A Marine Corps Operational Employment Concept to meet an Uncertain Security Environment. February 2008.

<sup>11</sup> This robust engineering capability may be augmented with U.S. Navy Construction Battalions (SeaBees).

<sup>12</sup> Providing veterinary services to indigenous populations can be essential if animals are still a crucial part of the local economic system.

information operations, and interagency liaisons. The air component will be a task-organized squadron, but again focused on the mobility of the SCMAGTF, reconnaissance and force protection.

The SCMAGTF will be staffed with former foreign area officers (FAO) and regional affairs officers (RAO) who are familiar with the country that the SCMAGTF deploys into. Linguists and if possible Marines who are from the country or are native speakers of languages in the country will be assigned to the SCMAGTF. The SCMAGTF's training focus will remain on conventional operations, but will have specialized training in order to teach partner nations how to improve their internal defense. The SCMAGTF will also have a strong cultural and language training programs to prepare Marines for interacting with local populations in failing states.

In the 6 phases in the Joint Continuum of Military Operations<sup>13</sup>, the United States military has mastered Phase 3 and no force on earth will stand toe to toe with the United States military, but as we engage failing states we must concentrate on Phase 0, 1, 4, 5 and 6. The SCMAGTF will have its most influential role in Phase 0 operations. It will be some time before the United States government can apply all elements of national power in a concerted effort, so if the SCMAGTF can buy time and begin working now to secure pathways and footholds into countries now vice postponing and delaying. The SCMAGTF will be a crucial part of the forward presence and persistent engagement of the United States policies. As important, but not as advertised will be the intelligence gained by the SCMAGTF. The SCMAGTF will enable Regional Combatant Commander an increased situational awareness in the region.

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<sup>13</sup> Phase 0 is shaping the environment, Phase 1 is deterring the enemy, Phase 2 is seizing the initiative, Phase 3 is dominating the enemy, Phase 4 is stabilizing the environment and Phase 5 is enabling civil authority.

Once Marines have begun to engage a failing state, there are certain principles that all Marines must adhere to when participating in these operations.

1. Ensure all Marines understand the mission. Marines are absolutely amazing young men and women. Professionals, who will do everything and anything they are told to do. In order to do their job correctly, they must be educated on why they are performing their mission and fully informed on the entire mission.
2. Manage expectations. As operations begin in failing states there will be expectations on the competency of the local security forces, government officials, police, etc. This must be avoided and Marines must go into the situation with an open mind. Some local customs are perceived as corruption to westerners, but to the locals it is good manners. The expectation must be an understanding on what is essential to the mission and what is a nuisance. In some failing states, the leaders will be so called warriors who are not rational actors. Ralph Peters wrote in his article The New Warrior Class; "Unlike soldiers, warriors do not play by our rules, do not respect treaties, and do not obey orders they do not like."<sup>14</sup> This is not an easy concept for Marines to deal with, but it is a reality that they will face. Marines must go into operations with an understanding that previous expectations may not be fully met, but the overall intent for the mission is successful.
3. Intelligence collection. This is a key concept because measuring the effects of programs is very difficult. Intelligence is an area that is constantly pointed to as a weakness. But it is only a weakness when commanders ask for the wrong information and focus their intelligence specialists into areas that are not

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<sup>14</sup> Ralph Peters, The New Warrior Class, Parameters, Summer 1996.

important. On a range every Marine is a safety officer; in operations every Marine is an intelligence collector. Every Marine can help develop the intelligence picture on key ethnic, cultural, tribal, economic and political relationships, non-military security forces, infrastructure, sanitation and health structure, munitions facilities, border controls and customs processes. An effective system requires not just collection of information from multiple sources (some degree of redundancy is essential) but also processing, classifying, evaluating, storing, and retrieving information.<sup>15</sup>

4. Embrace Non Governmental Organizations. Non Governmental Organizations are organization created by private persons or organizations with no participation or representation of any government. These organizations try to improve the welfare of poverty stricken nations, ensure human rights, distribute humanitarian aid and a myriad of other benevolent actions. Several of these organizations are very leery of the United States military and will go out of their way not to deal with the United States military.<sup>16</sup> Some will only deal with the U.S. military if they need security for their convoys or distribution centers.
5. Balance of strength and compassion. When the Marine Corps is sent into a country there must be a balancing act. Most cultures have a preconceived notion on what masculinity is and how a man acts. If you act to weak you will be taken advantage of, if you act to strong you will destroy relationships. In Bosnia, the United Nations forces were perceived as weak and Serbs, Croats and Muslims

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<sup>15</sup> Nathan Leites and Charles Wolf Jr., *Rebellion and Authority: An Analytic Essay on Insurgent Conflicts* (RAND Corporation, Report R.-462-ARPA, February 1970).

<sup>16</sup> Some NGOs have charters that do not allow them to work with military forces at all.

commandeered over 500 United Nations vehicles.<sup>17</sup> Then acting too strong as the Marine who shot and killed the boy who stole his sunglasses in Somalia, will never foster relationships

6. Cultural awareness saves lives. In many areas of the world, honor is more important than money or even a life. Insulting or slighting an individual can cause him to turn to violence. If a foreigner came to a town in the United States who spoke English, understood the law, traffic rules and social interactions. He would have very little problems. Think about how you act and speak.
7. Higher headquarters may not have the best plan, so everyone should be thinking of better ways to do the job. Sharing thoughts and planning are important and will help the overall mission, but execution must be well coordinated.
8. The effect of your operation is not measured in how well you think you did, but how local people feel you did. There are many terms 'effects base operations', 'winning hearts and minds' and many others. The fight is not on a set enemy or based on gaining terrain, it is based with the people and winning the people's support and establishing friendships and relationships is the goal in the failing states engagement plan.
9. Money is a two way blade it can hurt as well as help. Economics is a way that local leaders keep control over their people. They control all economic aspects and that is a way that they extend their influence. When you buy things or build things and inject money into the system, it may appear to help the population, but it can also hurt you relationships with local leaders.

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<sup>17</sup> David Rohde. Endgame: The Betrayal and Fall of Srebrenica, Europe's Worst Massacre since World War II.

10. The local population may want to help you, but remember that anyone who helps you may become a target for the enemy. There is a “kiss of death syndrome” that the United States military forces must be aware of. The US military will surge in and attempt or persuade the local population to work with the US military, then the security will be relaxed and insurgents return and kill all the people who cooperated.

### **The Danger of Dealing with Failing States.**

*Danger is part of the friction of war. Without an accurate conception of danger we cannot understand war.* Carl Von Clausewitz. On War, pg. 114.

Even though Clausewitz is describing war, it is a phenomenal piece of advice that states nothing can be fully comprehended without carefully examining the dangers involved. The engagement of failing states and follow up operations that will be conducted in these countries cannot be entered into lightly. These operations are truly extensive operations, operations that will cost in massive investment of money, manpower and time. Stabilization operations are very labor intensive. “The United States will sometimes have ambitious goals for transforming a society in a conflicted environment. Those goals may well demand 20 troops per 1,000 inhabitants . . . working for five to eight years. Given that we may have three to five stabilization and reconstruction activities underway concurrently, it is clear that very substantial resources are needed to accomplish national objectives.”<sup>18</sup> To fully understand the numbers that may have to be committed to failing states see Appendix 2. Other dangers faced by engaging in failing states will be perceptions from the local populations that the United States will leave if it gets too expensive in money or lives, like in Somalia, Vietnam, or Lebanon. This will have a very

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<sup>18</sup> U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Science Board, 2004 Summer Study on Transition to and from Hostilities, December 2004, [http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/2004-12-DSB\\_SS\\_Report\\_Final.pdf](http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/2004-12-DSB_SS_Report_Final.pdf)



negative effect when U.S. Military forces try to get volunteers and/or cooperation from local leaders. Local people will not want to waste their time or cooperate with the United States military if they will just leave under pressure. For operations in failing states will need going to leave. As the United States enters into these failing states, it must be acknowledged that some problems are so complex that there is no solution to them. Sometimes just getting to a point that the problem has been solved "enough" or just the situation has improved is a success.

The Marine Corps cannot lose its focus on warfighting. As we are seeing today in Afghanistan, our allies are more comfortable doing policing type actions and are not eager to participate in combat operations. The Marine Corps must keep its warfighting skills in top order; it is much easier to throttle down a highly trained infantry Marine than to try to throttle up a social worker. The Marine Corps is built on a warfighter tradition, and even though this paper discusses a "softer side" of the Marine Corps and assistance to failing states, the bayonets must stay sharp.

**Conclusion:** *You can't build a reputation on what you're going to do.* Henry Ford

The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism states that the United States will continue to lead an expansive international effort in pursuit of a two-pronged vision:

- The defeat of violent extremism as a threat to our way of life as a free and open society;
- and
- The creation of a global environment inhospitable to violent extremists and all who support them.

To create this global environment, the United States has committed itself to help failing states. This is for many other reasons to include; preventing dangerous conditions in these failing states from harming the United States and/or its allies, to prevent regional instability and conflict, and to show that the United States is a compassionate country that is truly concerned with human suffering. In this commitment the United States will rely on the United States Marine Corps to take a lead in this commitment. The Marine Corps has the infrastructure, historical background, organization, and adaptability handle this unique mission. In order to complete this mission of assisting failing states, it must be looked at as a continuous operation and not a campaign. This is an operation that will be needed for decades. Preventing conflicts has always been preferred to fighting them, by pushing out now with a strong mix of all the elements of the United States' power and start building (or rebuilding) the reputation that the United States is working to build allies and not colonies. Hope is not an option for planning military operations, but bringing hope to people will be a crucial part of military operations in the future.

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# THE FAILED STATES INDEX 2007

[www.ForeignPolicy.com](http://www.ForeignPolicy.com)

## STATES OF FAILURE

-  Critical
-  In Danger
-  Borderline
-  Stable
-  Most Stable



## APPENDIX 2

### “Critical” Failed States with Defense Science Board Estimations for Troops Needed

Country	Ranking	Population	Troops Required for	
			Ambitious Goals	Less Ambitious Goals
Côte d'Ivoire	1	17,298,040	345,961	86,490
Dem. Rep. of the Congo	2	60,085,804	1,201,716	300,429
Sudan	3	40,187,486	803,750	200,937
Iraq	4	26,074,906	521,498	130,375
Somalia	5	8,591,629	171,833	42,958
Sierra Leone	6	6,017,643	120,353	30,088
Chad	7	9,826,419	196,528	49,132
Yemen	8	20,727,063	414,541	103,635
Liberia	9	3,482,211	69,644	17,411
Haiti	10	8,121,622	162,432	40,608
Afghanistan	11	29,928,987	598,580	149,645
Rwanda	12	8,440,820	168,816	42,204
North Korea	13	22,912,177	458,244	114,561
Colombia	14	42,954,279	859,086	214,771
Zimbabwe	15	12,746,990	254,940	63,735
Guinea	16	9,467,866	189,357	47,339
Bangladesh	17	144,319,628	2,886,393	721,598
Burundi	18	6,370,609	127,412	31,853
Dominican Republic	19	8,950,034	179,001	44,750
Central African Republic	20	3,799,897	75,998	18,999

Population figures from CIA World Factbook, online at <http://cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook>.

“Ambitious goals” equal 20 troops per 1,000 indigens.

“Less ambitious goals” equal 5 troops per 1,000 indigens.

## APPENDIX 3

### Definitions of Government Documents

**The National Security Strategy of the United States of America** is a document prepared periodically by the executive branch of the government of the United States for congress which outlines the major national security concerns of the United States and how the administration plans to deal with them.

**The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism** is a document that outlines the United States government's plan for fighting terrorism.

**National Security Presidential Directive** is a Presidential Decision in the area of National Security.

**National Defense Strategy of the United States of America** is a document prepared periodically by the Department of Defense which outlines how the United States military will be employed to defend the United States. It should be nested within the National Security Strategy.

**National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism** is a document that outlines the United States military's plan for fighting terrorism.

**Military Support to Stabilization, Security, Transition and Reconstruction Operations, Joint Operating Concept (Military Support to SSTR Operations, JOC)** is a document that was published by the Department of Defense to outline how the United States military would support the United States government's plan for dealing with failing or failed states.

**Department of State and USAID Strategic Plan FY 2007-2012** sets forth the Secretary of State's direction and priorities for both organizations in the coming years. The Strategic Plan supports the policy positions set forth by the 2006 National Security Strategy and presents how the Department and USAID will implement U.S. foreign policy and development assistance.




Unclassified



# Security Cooperation MAGTF

Task organized to meet specific COCOM requirements



- Persistent forward presence
- Regiment focuses on a specific region
- Maximizes potential of USMC language and culture training initiatives
- Personnel with language and culture experience in region are assigned when possible to this regiment
- Regiment conducts overall full-spectrum and deployment focused training of battalions. Specific training in line with COCOM / MarFor SC requirements
- Capable of re-aggregating for crisis response, but specifically tailored for security cooperation activities.



MAGTF CE could be Infantry BN commander and existing staff, or augmented with additional staff and senior commander as mission and political situation dictate.

GCE



Infantry Battalion forms the core of the MAGTF

- Bn conducts full spectrum training in pre-deployment dwell time.
- Portion of workup is security cooperation tailored training.
- Unit receives language and culture package from CAOCL to augment existing expertise

LCE



Combat Logistics Company provides traditional CS/CSS functions to MAGTF but with additional capabilities for SC:

- Engineering capability
- Additional Medical and Dental capabilities
- Other elements as required to meet COCOM / MarFor requirements.

ACE



(-)

ACE is task organized for specific mission requirements. Typical construct could consist of:

- 6 x V-22
- 2 x CH-53E/K
- 2 x UH-1Y
- 2 x KC-130J
- MWSS and MACG det to support

Additional capabilities / attachments as required:


- Civil Affairs det / planners
- Operational Law SME
- Information Operations
- Veterinary capabilities
- IA liaisons (State, Agriculture, Commerce, USAID...)
- Military Working Dogs, HUMINT, Band, others as needed



# Arc of Instability

Political Map of the World, April 2007

Legend:  
 - Countries with a high level of instability  
 - Countries with a low level of instability  
 - Capital  
 - Major cities  
 - International boundaries  
 - National boundaries



April 2007